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ii 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter arises out of a criminal case in which the Appellant, Jason Ward, 
was convicted of Rape after a Jury Trial. 
II. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Did the use of the Appellant's testimony from a previously withdrawn guilty 
plea violate the fundamental constitutional rights of a Appellant? 
2. Did the prosecution commit prosecutorial misconduct and in it's questioning 
of the defense witness? 
3. Did the Trial Court error in the admission of evidence over an objection as 
to chain of custody? 
4. Does the Cumulative Error Doctrine Apply? 
Ill. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant was originally charged with Rape by a complaint on the 27th day 
of May, 2011. The charge was based on the following facts. 
1. The 911 call 
At the jury trial, the recording of the original 911 was admitted. A summary of 
the call is as follows. 
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Initially the complaining witness called 911 to report being raped. Although she 
knew the appellant, the complaining witness denied knowing who allegedly raped her 
to the 911 operator. She further gave false information as to the description of the 
perpetrator as to his height. She further misled the 911 operator by stating that the 
perpetrator was driving a white 4-door Oldsmobile, and could not remember which 
direction it headed after leaving her in the country. 
She further stated that the alleged perpetrator threatened her if she were to 
report the incident to the police. The police arrived and she was eventually taken to 
a hospital where evidently her story changed. 
2. The Change of Plea. 
The Appellant hired private counsel and the case proceeded to Jury Trial. 
(Transcript, Pages 23-24). A significant amount of discovery was exchanged and the 
Jury Trial was set for December 20, 2011. 
On the day of Jury Trial, the trial counsel informed the Appellant that this was 
not a case that he could win and that because Mr. Ward was on probation for Felony 
Driving Under the Influence, that even if the jury acquitted him, the Court could 
revoke his probation and sentence him to prison. (See Affidavit of Jason Ward, 
Clerk's Record, Pages 185-188; Transcript, Pages. 11, Line 23 and Page 13, Line 
24). 
Based on the advice of counsel, the Appellant, Jason Ward, then pied guilty to 
the charge. He was sworn and testified as to the basis of the charge, admitting to 
the Rape. (Transcript, Pages 8-17). 
3. The Plea Withdrawal. 
After pleading guilty, the Appellant changed counsel and moved to withdraw his 
guilty plea. The Appellant testified, at the hearing to withdraw his guilty plea, that his 
plea was based upon the advice of counsel. However, this advice of counsel was 
erroneous as the felony Driving Under the Influence charge arose after the charge of 
Rape and therefore, his probation on felony DUI could not be a knowing voluntary 
waiver of his rights. 
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The Trial Court agreed that the Appellant's trial counsel misstated the law 
(Transcript Page 74, Lines 8-11). He found that the Appellant relied upon this 
misstatement (Transcript Page 74, Lines 12-14). The Trial Court further found that, 
because of his reliance on the misstatement of law of counsel, his plea was not 
knowing and voluntary (Transcript Page 75, Lines 1-3). Therefore, the plea was not 
properly taken and he allowed the Appellant to withdraw his plea (Transcript Page 
76, Lines 4-7). Implicit in this finding is that the Appellant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel in the plea negotiations and therefore, the Court was required 
to allow Mr. Ward to withdraw his plea. 
4. The Jury Trial. 
The case then went on to Jury Trial with new counsel. Trial was held on July 2, 
2012. 
At trial, the complaining witness testified very distinctly from her 911 phone call. 
The complaining witness testified that she had met the Appellant before, that on the 
day of the alleged rape, the Appellant, Colby Redgrave, a prior boyfriend and others 
went water-skiing. (Transcript Pages 104-16). Later, she, Colby and Mr. Ward 
ended up at the home of Mr. Ward to drink. (Transcript, Pages 107-108). At the 
Appellant's home, all parties drank to, most likely, the point of intoxication. 
(Transcript, Pages 109 -110). 
Later, she desired to go home and Mr. Ward drove her home, although she 
stated she did not go voluntarily. (Transcript, Page 120, Lines 6-7). She got in Mr. 
Ward's 4-door pickup truck. (Transcript, Page 120, Lines 19-20). 
She then testified that on the way home, Mr. Ward stopped and raped her on 
the side of the road. (Transcript, Pages 135-137). She then got back into the truck 
and smoked 2 cigarettes. (Transcript, Pages 138-141 ). They then had sex again. 
(Transcript, Pages 141 - 142). They then got back into the truck and he drove until 
he told her to get out. (Transcript, Page 149, Lines 7-11). 
Mr. Ward testified that they indeed went water-skiing that day and ended up at 
his house to party. (Transcript, Pages 459-461). He testified that he was going to 
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drive the complaining witness to her mother's house in Hansen. (Transcript, Pages 
463-465). After they started driving, complaining witness asked him to pull over so 
they could have sex. (Transcript, Pages 465-466). Eventually, they had sex twice. 
The complaining witness then asked to be dropped off so her sister could come and 
pick her up. (Transcript, Pages 477-488). On cross-examination, the State was 
allowed to use the testimony from the Change of Plea Hearing for impeachment 
purposes pursuant to I.R.E. 41 0(b)(3). The state then required Mr. Ward to read the 
transcript of the Change of Plea Hearing. (Transcript, Pages 488-490). The court 
allowed the State to require Mr. Ward to read his testimony as to the elements of the 
charge that he had previously admitted. 
The Jury found the Appellant guilty of Rape and the Appellant was sentenced 
to a term of twenty (20) years in prison, consisting of the first seven (7) years fixed 
and thirteen (13) years indeterminate. 
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. Did the use of the Appellant's testimony from a previously withdrawn 
guilty plea violate the fundamental constitutional rights of a Appellant? 
Admittedly, this issue was not raised below at the trial court. Trial counsel 
allowed the use of the Change of Plea testimony, without objection. This is most 
likely because I.RE. 410(b)(3) specifically allows for this use. The rule states: 
Rule 410. Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and related statements 
(a) Inadmissibility. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following 
is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who 
made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: 
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(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; 
(2) a plea of nolo contendere; 
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of the Idaho 
Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable Federal or state procedure regarding 
either of the foregoing pleas; or 
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the 
prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of 
guilty later withdrawn. 
(b) Exceptions. Notwithstanding the foregoing, such a statement is admissible: 
(1) in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same 
plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be 
considered contemporaneously with it; or 
(2) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made 
by the defendant under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel; or 
(3) under subsection (a) (3) above, in the same criminal action or proceeding for 
impeachment purposes. 
However, its use in this case infringes on the appellant's fundamental rights 
against self-incrimination and to effective assistance of counsel. The rule therefore 
has an unconstitutional effect in this case. 
The Court generally will not consider issues that were not raised at trial unless 
the defendant demonstrates fundamental error, i.e., "that one of his unwaived 
constitutional rights was plainly violated." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 
P.3d 961, 978 (2010) 
When an Appellant raises an issue on Appeal, not raised at Trial, the 
Courts in Idaho will engage in the following analysis: 
(2) If the alleged error was not followed by a 
contemporaneous objection, it shall only be reviewed by 
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an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental error 
doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry 
wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading 
the appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one 
or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; 
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, 
including information as to whether the failure to object 
was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. If the 
defendant persuades the appellate court that the 
complained of error satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then 
the appellate court shall vacate and remand. 
Id. 227-28, 245 P.3d at 979-80. 
The appellant requests that the Court review this case because it implicates 
such important constitutional rights as a defendant's Fifth Amendment Right against 
self incrimination and Sixth Amendment Right to affective assistance of counsel. 
Unfortunately, there are nor reported cases regarding 1.R.E. 41 0(b)(3), in the 
State of Idaho. Further, subsection (b)(3) seems to be unique to Idaho, leaving us 
without the benefits of other courts to help shed light in this situation. 
The purpose of the rule appears to be straight forward. In general, parties to 
plea negotiations need to know their efforts are protected, allowing the freedom to 
discuss and pursue alternatives. The plea bargaining process is an essential 
component of the criminal justice system and needs to be encouraged. Santobello 
v. N. Y., 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495 (1971). This should extend to all logical actions 
taken in accordance with a plea bargain. 
A criminal defendant also has several other important constitutional rights that 
come into play in this situation. Important among them is the Fifth Amendment right 
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against self-incrimination. This requires that any statement used against a criminal 
defendant must be deemed voluntary. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 
1774 (1964). This prevents defendants from being convicted on coerced 
statements. 
Also important is a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. This is 
an important right. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution also assures a criminal 
defendant of "reasonably competent assistance of counsel." Gibson v. State, 110 
Idaho 631, 635, 718 P.2d 283, 287 (1986). 
It is with all of these concepts in mind, that the Appellant asserts that, prior to 
allowing the use of such testimony, the Court should have determined whether those 
statements were made voluntarily and were reliable. Since this is a question of 
constitutional rights, the Court can exercise free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 
576, 261 P.3d 853 (2011). 
The Courts in Colorado have encountered this problem numerous times. They 
have consistently held that statements that are not voluntary cannot be used against 
a defendant, even for impeachment purposes. See, State v. Cole, 584 P.2d 71 
(Colo. 1978); People v. McCormick, 881 P.2d 423 (Colo. App. 1994). 
For example, in People v. Butler929 P.2d 36 (Colo. App. 1996), a Defendant 
has plead guilty and, subsequent to pleading guilty, had made certain statements to 
the police. Later said Defendant was allowed to withdraw his plea and the State 
attempted to use those statements made to the police after the change of plea. The 
Court found that while his plea had been withdrawn, the statements made 
subsequent to his plea to the police were knowing and voluntary and therefore, they 
could be used against the Defendant. 
While the Colorado Court found the admission of the statements to be proper, 
important is the analysis. They reviewed the statements made to police subsequent 
to the change of plea and found that they were knowing and voluntary. 
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In this case, the Court made an express finding that Mr. Ward's plea was not a 
knowing and voluntary plea and therefore it was required to be withdrawn. It has long 
been held that a defendant's plea must be knowing and voluntary as to not violate the 
defendant's rights. State v. Salisbury, 143 ID 467, 147 P.3d 108 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Therefore, if a plea is not knowing an voluntary, any statements made in 
connection to the plea agreement are also not knowing and voluntary. Allowing the 
use of the defendant's testimony, even for impeachment purposes, allows the State 
to continue the ineffective assistance of counsel experienced by Mr. Ward and 
violates his right to self-incrimination. 
It appears clear that the first two prongs of the Perry test are satisfied. First, 
there is a clear violation of the appellant's rights. And Secondly, it is clear from the 
record that his rights were violated without his knowledge. 
The more difficult question is whether the use of the testimony for 
impeachment purposes prejudiced the Appellant. Instructive on this point is the Trial 
Court's comments at the sentencing hearing. The Trial Court stated that it was left 
with the belief that neither side told the whole story. (Transcript Page 521 ). In such a 
case, any evidence can be significant in determining how much weight the jurors 
placed on such testimony. It is difficult not to assume the testimony of the appellant 
influenced the jury's finding of guilt. 
Therefore, the violation of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights requires that 
the verdict be vacated and the case be remanded for a new trial. 
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2. Did the prosecution commit prosecutorial misconduct and in it's 
questioning of a defense witness? 
At trial, the Defendant called Caleb Redgrave as a witness. Caleb was the 
former boyfriend of the alleged victim and a friend of the Appellant. In cross-
examination the following occurred : 
Q: When you invited the two girls, Sonia and her cousin over, were you trying 
to get some girls for Mr. Ward? 
(Transcript, Page 447, Lines 9-11). 
Trial counsel objected and a conference at the bench occurred. (Transcript p. 447, 
Lines 16-18). 
The prosecutor furthered the misconduct: 
Q: Momentarily. And it's your -
MR. SMETHERS: Judge we would request the prosecutor not make 
gratutitous comments and noises in front of the jury. 
THE COURT: I didn't observe anything. 
MR. SMETHERS: She, just for the record, Judge, she laughed and said 
"momentarily" like she was mocking the witness. 
THE COURT: So noted. 
(Transcript, Page 448, Lines 7-15). 
After a recess, trial counsel moved for a mistrial based upon the prosecutor's 
actions. (Transcript, Pages 452 - 455). 
When an objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct is raised at trial, the 
Court uses a two-part test to determine whether the misconduct requires reversal. 
See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,448, 816 P.2d 1002, 1005 
(Ct.App.1991 ). First, the Court reviews whether the prosecutor's challenged action 
was improper. State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 
(Ct.App.2003). If it was not, then there was no prosecutorial misconduct. Id. If the 
conduct was improper, we then consider whether the misconduct" prejudiced the 
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defendant's right to a fair trial or whether it was harmless." Id. The defendant carries 
the burden of proving prejudice. State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 232, 542 P.2d 63, 66 
(1975). When a defendant is unable to demonstrate prejudice, the misconduct will be 
regarded as harmless error. State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 111, 594 P.2d 146, 149 
(1979). 
Insinuating that Mr. Redgrave was acting as a pimp to get some girls is totally 
indefensible. There was no evidence to support such a charge. Further, mocking 
and making noises at a witness diminishes the credibility of a witness. The State's 
actions were an attempt to improperly discredit the witness and violated the 
appellant's rights to a fair trial. 
3. Did the Trial Court error in the admission of evidence over an 
objection as to chain of custody? 
Over the objection of the defendant, the trial court admitted DNA evidence of 
the defendant and the complaining witness. Trial counsel objected that the chain of 
custody of these items were not established as the officer taking these samples, did 
not testify. Trial counsel was allowed to make its motion and the trial court denied the 
motion and admitted the evidence. (Transcript, Pages 420-424). 
The problem is that the investigating office, Detective Becky White had left the 
Twin Falls Sheriff's office under circumstances dealing with dishonesty. (See Clerk's 
Record, Pages 252-254). Without her testimony, a proper chain was not established. 
A trial court's determination that evidence is supported by a proper foundation 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 757, 838 
P.2d 885, 886 (Ct.App.1992). 
Without Detective White's testimony, the chain was not established as 
required by I.R.E. 901 and the evidence should not have been admitted. 
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4. Does the Cumulative Error Doctrine Apply? 
If the Court finds that none of the errors are sufficient to justify reversal, the 
appellant believes that the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal. Under 
the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, 
may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Adamcik, 272 P.3d 
417, 152 Idaho 445 (Idaho 2012). 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the appellant asks that the jury verdict be 
vacated and his case remanded for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~day of September, 2013 
pondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Cf!J day of September, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document upon the attorney(s) named below 
in the manner noted: 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
X By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
at the post office in Rupert, Idaho. 
__ By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attorneys(s) at his 
office in the address stated above. 
__ By telecopying copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the telecopied 
number(s) ____ , and by then mailing copies of the same in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post office in Rupert, Idaho. 
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